Official Despatches

DESPATCH FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
No. 1396/H.F. 0022.

" Iron Duke "

18th June 1916.

Sir,

Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that in accordance with the instructions contained in their Lordships' telegram No. 434 of 30th May, Code time 1740, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea on 30th May 1916.

2. The instructions given to those portions of the fleet that were not in company with my flag at Scapa Flow were as follows :-

To Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, with Second Battle Squadron at Invergordon :— " Leave as soon as ready. Pass through Lat. 58° 15' N., Long. 2° 0' E., meet me 2.0 p.m. to-morrow 31st, Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. Several enemy submarines known to be in North Sea." Acknowledge. 1930 (Code time)."

To Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the Battlecruiser fleet at Rosyth, with the Fifth Battle Squadron, Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in company :— " Urgent, Priority. Admiralty telegram 1740. Available vessels. Battle-cruiser Fleet, Fifth Battle Squadron and T.B.D.s including Harwich T.B.D.s proceed to approximate position Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 5° 0' E. Desirable to economise T.B.D.'s fuel. Presume you will be there about 2.0 p.m. tomorrow 31st. I shall be in about Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. by 2.0 p.m. unless delayed by fog. Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, " Chester " and " Canterbury " will leave with me. I will send them on to your rendezvous. If no news by 2.0 p.m. stand towards me to get in visual touch. I will steer for Horn Reef from position Lat. 57° 45 'N., Long 4° 15' E. Repeat back rendezvous. 1937 (Code time)."

3. I felt no anxiety in regard to the advanced position of the force under Sir David Beatty, supported as it was by four ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron as this force was far superior in gun power to the First Scouting Group and the speed of the slowest ships was such as to enable it to keep out of range of superior enemy forces.

4. The operation, however, showed that the ships of the Third Squadron of the High Sea Fleet possess an unexpected turn of speed for at any rate a short period. The " Queen Elizabeth " class are nominally 25-knot vessels. The official Quarterly Return of British and Foreign War Vessels gives the " Konig " and " Kaiser " classes a designed speed of 20.5 knots. I have always expected that they might reach 22 knots for a short distance, but the fact that the Fifth Battle Squadron was unable to increase its distance from the German ships when steaming at their utmost speed comes as an unpleasant surprise and will have considerable effect on the conduct of future operations. It is quite evident that all German ships possess a speed much in excess of that for which they are nominally designed.

5. When Sir David Beatty sighted the enemy - battle-cruisers he adopted the correct and only possible course in engaging and endeavouring to keep between the enemy and his base. Whether the First Scouting Group was supported or not, his duty would be to engage and keep touch with the enemy's vessels of similar class to his own, so long as he was not in manifestly inferior force. In this case he had a great superiority, and there could be no question as to his action.

6. The disturbing feature of the battle-cruiser action is the fact that five German battle-cruisers engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first twenty minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the " Queen Elizabeth " class, were yet able to sink the " Queen Mary " and " Indefatigable." It is true that the enemy suffered very heavily later, and that one vessel, the " Lutzow," was undoubtedly destroyed, but even so the result cannot be other than unpalatable. The facts which contributed to the British losses were, first, the indifferent armour protection of our battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour and deck plating, and, second, the disadvantage under which our vessels laboured in regard to the light. Of this there can be no question. But it is also undoubted that the gunnery of the German battle-cruisers in the early stages was of a very high standard. They appeared to get on to their target and establish hitting within two or three minutes of opening fire in almost every case, and this at very long ranges of 18,000 yards. The German vessels appear to use some such system of fire as the Petravic method as the guns do not go off exactly together, and it unquestionably gives excellent results. The " spread " for both direction and elevation is very small and the rapidity of fire very great.

7. Once we commence hitting, the German gunnery falls off, but—as shown by the rapidity with which the " Invincible " was sunk at a later stage—their ships are still able to fire with great accuracy even when they have received severe punishment.

8. The fact that the gunnery of the German battlefleet when engaged with our battlefleet did not show the same accuracy must not, I think, be taken as showing that the standard is not so high as with their battle-cruisers, as I am inclined to the opinion that we then had some advantage in the way of light, although it was very bad for both sides.

9. The German organisation at night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly compelled to the opinion that under night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them.

10. The German tactics during the action were those which have always been anticipated, and for which provision has been made so far as is possible in my Battle Orders. The " turn away " of the enemy under cover of torpedo boat destroyer attacks is a move most difficult to counter, but which has been closely investigated on the Tactical Board. Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee has rendered me much assistance in the study of this particular movement and in devising a counter to it. There is no real counter. Nothing but ample time and superior speed can be an answer, and this means that unless the meeting of the fleets takes place fairly early in the day it is most difficult, if not impossible, to fight the action to a finish. In this particular case, thanks to the fact that the enemy did not, as far as can be seen, expect to find our whole fleet present, there was no time for him to lay a prepared mine area, and not much time to place his submarines, although many submarines were present. It is unlikely that in future operations we shall be so favoured in this respect, and the element of time will therefore be still more important. I foreshadowed in my letter of Oct. 30th, 1914, No. 339/HF/0034, in which their Lordships expressed concurrence, A.L. of November 7th, 1914, M.03177/14, the possibility of it being actually necessary purposely to delay bringing the fleet to close action for some time on account of the possibilities which the mine and submarine give for preparing a trap on a large scale, and it should be understood that this possibility still exists and will be increased as the enemy gets stronger in submarines.

11. It was unnecessary for me to give any special orders to the flag officers during the action. Events followed the course that was expected. All squadrons and flotillas took up their stations as directed in the Battle Orders with most commendable accuracy under very difficult circumstances. The torpedo attacks launched by the enemy were countered in the manner previously intended, and practised, during exercises, and the fleet was manoeuvred to close again after these attacks by the method which had been adopted for this purpose. The handling of the large fleet was immensely facilitated by the close co- operation and support afforded me by the flag officers.

12. One of the features of the action was the large number of torpedoes that crossed our line without taking effect on any ship except the " Marlborough." Sir Cecil Burney estimates that at least twenty-one torpedoes were seen to cross the line of his squadron. All were avoided by skilful handling, except that single one, and it is notable that the " Marlborough " herself evaded seven. Similarly the Fifth Battle Squadron, in rear of the First Battle Squadron, avoided a considerable number and other squadrons had similar experiences. It is of supreme importance to keep from the knowledge of the enemy the fact that ships were able to avoid torpedoes by seeing the track, as it would not be beyond the ingenuity of the Germans to devise a means of preventing any track being left.

13. The experience and results of the action, particularly the knowledge we now have of the speed of the enemy's Third Squadron, must exercise considerable influence on our future dispositions and tactics. It will, for instance, not be advisable in future to place our Fifth Battle Squadron in a position removed from support. I have these questions under consideration and will submit my conclusions to their Lordships.

14. A narrative of the action is enclosed.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. R. JELLICOE,

Admiral.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

NARRATIVE
Enclosure No. 1 in H.F. letter No. 1,396, dated 18th June 1916. NARRATIVE. 31st May.

At. 9.30 p.m., "Iron Duke," First and Fourth Battle Squadrons, Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, Second Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron, Commodore (F), Fourth and Twelfth Flotillas, and four destroyers of Eleventh Flotilla, " Canterbury " and " Chester " left Scapa.

At 10 p.m., the Second Battle Squadron, First Cruiser Squadron and remainder of the Eleventh Flotilla left Cromarty.

At 10 p.m., " Lion," First and Second Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, First, Second and Third Light-Cruiser Squadrons, '' Fearless " and nine boats of First Flotilla, " Champion " and ten of Thirteenth Flotilla, eight destroyers of Harwich force and " Engadine," left Rosyth.

At 10.40 p.m., the Fifth Battle Squadron (four ships) left Rosyth. A complete list of the ships present is given in Home Fleet's letter, No. 1,395, of 18th June 1916, and in Enclosure No. 2 to this despatch.

Disposition of the Fleet during the early portion of 31st May.

31st May.

Disposition of the Scapa force at 6 a.m. on 31 May :—

Battle fleet in divisions, line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in the order—3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th (Fifth Organisation), screened by the Fourth and Twelfth Flotillas; Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron three miles ahead of First and Fourth Battle Squadrons ; Second Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers spread five miles apart ten miles ahead of the battle squadrons. Battlefleet and Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron :— The Scapa and Cromarty forces proceeded for the 2 p.m. rendezvous ordered by the Commander-in-Chief in latitude 57° 45' N., longitude 4° 15' E., but actually met at 11.15 a.m. in latitude 58°' 13' N., longitude 2° 42' E. The Rosyth force proceeded for their 2 p.m. rendezvous in latitude 56° 40' N., longitude 5° E.

At 2 p.m. on 31 May, the " Dreadnought " battlefleet was in latitude 57° 57' N., longitude 3° 45' E., in Organisation No. 5, divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, divisions screened by the Fourth Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas ; Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron three miles ahead of the battlefleet ; cruisers and destroyers sixteen miles ahead of the battlefleet, spread eight miles apart on a line of direction N. 40° E., and S. 40° W., in the order from East to West : " Cochrane," " Shannon," " Minotaur," (centre of " Defence," " Duke of Edinburgh " Black Prince " " Hampshire," screen) " Warrior," attached cruisers on the flanks ; Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron "Chester " and "Canterbury" about twenty miles ahead; the whole steering S. 50° E., zig-zagging, with a speed of advance of fourteen knots.

Battle-Cruiser Fleet and Fifth Battle Squadron : At 2 p.m., in latitude 56° 46' N., longitude 4° 40' E., course N. by E., speed 19 knots. Order :— " Lion " and First Battle-Cruiser Squadron in singleline ahead, screened by " Champion " and ten destroyers of Thirteenth Flotilla (" Nestor," " Nomad," " Narborough." " Obdurate," " Petard," " Plican," " Nerissa," " Onslow," " Moresby," " Nicator," " Turbulent," and " Termagant "). Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, three miles E.N.E. of " Lion," screened by six destroyers of the Harwich force ("Lydiard," "Liberty," "Landrail," "Laurel," " Moorsom," and " Morris "). Fifth Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, five miles N.N.W. of " Lion," screened by " Fearless " and nine destroyers of First Flotilla ("Acheron," "Aerial," "Attack." "Hydra," "Beaver," "Goshawk," "Defender," "Lizard," and "Lapwing "). Light-Cruiser Squadrons forming a screen astern, eight miles S.S.E. from " Lion," ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles apart, in the order from West to East : •' Southampton," " Nottingham," " Fahiiouth," " Birkenhead," " Inconstant," " Galatea," f ' Birmingham," " Dublin," " Gloucester," " Cordeha," " Phaeton." " Engadine," seaplane carrier, was stationed between " Gloucester " and Cordelia." " Yarmouth " acted as linking ship between " Lion " and Light-Cruiser screen. The following is an extract from a report received from the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet, and explains clearly the course of the action until they joined forces with the battlefleet : At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from " Galatea " indicating the presence of enemy vessels to the E.S.E., steering to the Northward. The direction of advance was immediately altered to 8.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base. " Galatea " reported at 2.35 p.m., that she had sighted a large amount of smoke as from a fleet, bearing E.N.E. This made it clear that the enemy was to the Northward and Eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the Eastward and North Eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. They appeared to be the 1st Scouting group of five Battle-Cruisers. After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders spread to the East, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and Fifth Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy Light Cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the Battle Cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent and of great value. From a report from " Galatea " at 2.25 p.m., it was evident that the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of Light Cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered " Engadine " to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m., a seaplane with light Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst. Paymaster G. S. TreAvin, R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in " Engadine " about 3.30 p.m. Owing to the clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy Light Cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 ft., within 3,000 yards of them, the Light Cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Asst. Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value. At. 3.30 p.m., I increased speed to 25 knots and formed line of battle, the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.8.E.. slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The Fifth Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good. At 3.48 p.m., the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Both appeared to straddle the target early, and at 3.51 p.m., " Lion " received her first hit. Course was altered to the Southward, and subsequently at intervals, to confuse the enemy's fire control ; the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards. For the next ten minutes the firing of the enemy was very rapid and effective. " Lion " was hit repeatedly, the roof of " Q " turret being blown off at 4 p.m. Immediately afterwards " Indefatigable " was hit by three shots falling together. The shots appeared to hit the outer edge of the upper deck in line with the after turret. An explosion followed, and she fell out of the line sinking by the stern. Hit again by another salvo near " A " turret she turned over and disappeared. At 4.8. p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen of enemy submarines. In evidence of this a torpedo w^as sighted passing astern of " Lion " from star- board to port. The destroyer " Landrail " of 9th Flotilla, W'ho was on our Port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her Port quarter, and at the same time the track of a torpedo which passed under her and crossed the line of the Battle Cruisers between " Tiger " and " New Zealand." Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of " Lydiard " and " Landrail " undoubtedly preserved the Battle Cruisers from closer submarine attack, " Nottingham " also reported a submarine on the Starboard beam. Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, " Nestor," " Nomad," " Nicator," " Narborough," " Pelican," " Petard," " Obdurate," "Nerissa," with " Moorsom " and "Morris" of 10th Flotilla, " Turbulent " and " Termagant " of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out in a most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favouable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a Light Cruiser and 15 Destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, \\ith the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their Battle Cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their tor- pedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy Battle Cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack. " Nestor," " Nomad " and " Nicator," gallantly led by Commander The Hon. E. B. 8. Bingham, of " Nestor," pressed home their attack on the Battle Cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. " Nomad " was badly hit, and apparently remained stojjped between the lines. Subsequently " Nestor " and " Nicator " altered course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing Battle Cruisers, having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo " Nestor " was badly hit, and swung to starboard, " Nicator " altering course inside her to avoid coUision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. " Nicator " made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. " Nestor " remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. " Moorsom " also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet. " Petard," " Nerissa," " Turbulent " and " Termagant " also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes at a range of 7,000 yards after the engagement ^^dth enemy destroyers. " Petard " reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's hne, while " Nerissa " states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His ^lajesty's Nav}^ and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham for the Victoria Cross, and other officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry. From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m., the conflict between the opposing Battle-Cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The Fifth Battle Squadi*on was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m., the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the North-Eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outhne of the ships very indistinct. This, no doubt, was largely due to the constant use of smoke balls or charges b}^ the enemy, under cover of which they were continually altering course or zigzagging. At 4.2(i p.m., there was a violent explosion in " Queen Mary " ; she was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke, and disappeared. From the evidence of Captain Pelly, of " Tiger," who was in station astern, corroborated b}- Rear-Admiral Brock in " Princess Royal " ahead, a salvo jntched abreast of " Q " turret, and almost instantaneously there was a terrific upheaval and a dense cloud of smoke through which " Tiger " passed barely 30 seconds afterwards. No sign could be seen of " Queen Mary." Eighteen of her officers and men were subsequently picked up by " Laurel." At 4.38 p.m., " Southampton " reported the enemy's Battlefleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's battlefieet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 j)oints in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a Northerly course to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy Battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. " Southampton," with the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, held on to the Southward to observe. Thej^ closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battlefieet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. " Southampton's " reports were most valuable. The Fifth Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course, and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy battlefieet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan Thomas, M.V.O., in " Barham," this Squadron supported us brilHantly and effectively. At 4.57 ]i.m., the Fifth Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battlefieet. " Fearless," with the destroyers of the First Flotilla joined the Battle-cruisers and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. " Champion " with 13th Flotilla took station on the Fifth Battle Squadron. At 5.0 p.m., the First and Third Light-Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the Southerly Course, took station on my starboard bow; the Second Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter. The Aveather conditions now became unfavoiu*able, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only sho\^dng up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until AAe had turned their van at about 6.0 p.m. Between 5.0 and 6.0 p.m., the action continued on a Northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one of their Battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by " Princess Royal " and " Tiger." Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5. p.m., " Onslow " and " Moresby," who had been detached to assist " Engadine," with the seai)lane, rejoined the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of " Lion." At 5.10 p.m., " Moresby," being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship at a range of 6,000 to 8,000 yards, fired a long range torpedo at the third in their Hne. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what she judged to be the sixth ship in the line. Later analysis of the director setting indicated a probability of this result. " Moresby " then passed between the hnes to clear the range of smoke and rejoined "' Champion." In corroboration of this " Fearless " reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam, similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of " Queen Mary " and " Indefatigable." At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the North Eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 j'ards. He was gradually hauling to the Eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probabl}^ acting on information received from his Light-Cruisers which had sighted and were engaged wdth the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron {vide " Indomitable's " report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m., British Cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m., the leading battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing North 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to East and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy Battle-Cruisers bore South East. At this time only three of the enemy BattleCruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the " Konig " class. At about 6.5 p.m., " Onslow," being on the engaged bow of '' Lion," sighted an enemy Light-Cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. " Onslow " at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. " Onslow " then closed to within 8,000 yards of the enemy Battle-Cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was truck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Ofificer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the Light-Cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle-Fleet was 'then sighted at a distance of 8,000 yards, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them ; having started correctly, they must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage in her feed tank then caused " Onslow " to stop.

General Position. At 5 p.m., the position of affairs was as follows :— " Iron Duke's " position : — latitude 57° 24' N., longitude 5° 12' E., course S.E. by S. speed 20 knots, in company with the main battlefleet force, cruisers spread, destroyers screening. " Lion's " position (to " Iron Duke's " reckoning) : — lat. 56° 42' N., long. 5° 44' E., course N.N.W., speed 25 knots, in company with the Fifth Battle Squadron and First and Second Battle-Cruiser Squadrons. Enemy battle-cruisers bearing from "Lion" approximately E.S.E. seven miles; enemy battlefleet from " Barham " about S.S.E. nine miles. Weather Conditions. Up to 6 p.m. the weather conditions were wholly in favour of the enemy. The horizon to the eastward was entirely obscured by haze, and from the Fifth Battle Squadron when engaging enemy battleships and battle-cruisers only the flashes of the enemy guns could be made out. On the other hand, a strong light to the westward enabled the British sliips to be distinguished clearly by the enemy. This is indicated by the photograph^ enclosed, taken from " Malaya " by Midshipman Gerald W. Norman. The photograph was taken at about 5.15 p.m. towards the western horizon, the enemy at the same time being to the eastward. Our destroyers shown silhouetted against the bright horizon were at least eight miles distant. The splashes seen in the photograph are from Movements of the Fifth Battle Squadron. At 3.30 p.m., when the Battle-Cruiser Fleet formed line of battle, the Fifth Battle Squadron, consisting of " Barham,'" " Valiant," " Warspite " and " Malaya," in single line in the order named, were five miles from the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, bearing from them N.N.W. and conforming to their movements. At 3.56 p.m. fire was opened at some enemy hght-cruisers before the port beam steering about S.S.E. After two or three salvoes these enemy hght-cruisers turned away eight points and disappeared out of sight. At 4.02 p.m. the British battle-cruisers altered course gradually to the south-eastward, the enemy battle-cruisers also turned to the south-eastward. This turn enabled the Fifth Battle Squadron to gain, and at 4.06 fire was opened by pairs, concentrating on the two rear ships at a range of approximately 18,000 yards. At 4.21 p.m. the enemy battle-cruisers opened fire on the Fifth Battle Squadron, " Barham " being hit shortly after. At 4.40 p.m., by which time the Fifth Battle Squadron was heavily engaged with the enemy battle-cruisers, enemy destroyers were observed to be attacking, and were driven off by our lightcruisers and destroyers attached to the Battle-Cruiser Fleet. The squadron was turned away by Preparative-flag, and torpedoes were observed to cross the line, one ahead and one astern of " Vahant." At 4.50 p.m. our battle-cruisers, having previously turned to the northward, crossed the line of fire. At 4.53 the Fifth Battle Squadron turned sixteen points to starboard in succession by signal from the " Lion " (the enemy battle-cruisers having also turned to the northward). At 4.55 the enemy's battlefleet was sighted, bearing S.S.E., steering to the Northward, distant about 17,000 yards. " Barham " and " Valiant " continued to engage the enemjBattle-Cruisers while " Warspite and " Malaya " fired at the head of the enemy's battlefleet. At about 5.25 p.m., the squadron increased to full speed. During this period the light was very much in favour of the enemy and firing from the Fifth Battle Squadron was very intermittent, whereas a heavy but ineffective fire was received from the leading enemy battleships. At 6.06 p.m., " Marlborough " was sighted, and the Fifth Battle Squadron turned to form astern of the line at 6.18 p.m. Up to this time " Barham " had been hit six times by battlecruisers, " Vahant " was not hit. " Warspite " had been hit twice by either battle-cruisers or battleships. " Malaya " had been hit seven times aU by battleshi23s. Progress of the Action. Continuous reports were received in " Iron Duke " of the above reported movements. The Fleet was informed that the enemy battlefleet was coming North, and a wireless signal made to the Admiralty that a fleet action was imminent. Movements of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron. Turning now to the movements of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron. This squadron was originally stationed twenty miles ahead of the battlefleet, " Chester " (Captain Robert N. Lawson) acting as linking ship between the squadron and the cruiser line, " Canterbury " (Captain Percy M. Royds) being abreast of the squadron. At 4..") p.m.. the Commander-in-Chief ordered the RearAdiniral ( "ouiiiiaiKling. Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, to support the battle-cruiser fleet in action sixty miles to the soutlnvard in l)osition latitude 56° 53' N., longitude 5° 33' E., the RearAdmiral being informed that the enemy's course was reported to ))e H. 55° E., at 3.50 p.m. The Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron was at the time to the eastward, having turned to intercept the eneni}^ vessels reported by the First Light-Cruiser Squadron at 2.45 p.m., as steering North from position latitude 56° 52' N., longitude 5° 35' E. The Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron altered course to S. by E. and worked u}) to full speed. At 5.30 p.m., " Chester," which was five miles X. Hr W. of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, reported to " Invincible '* by searchlight that she had heard firing and seen flashes of gunfire to the southwestward and turned to investigate. At 5. 30 p.m., " Chester " observed a three-funnelled enemy light -cruiser with destroyers. An engagement ensued at about 6,000 yards, the enemy being reinforced by two, or possibly three, more light- cruisers. " Chester " turned to N.E., chased by the enemy ships, which had obtained the range and were inflicting considerable damage on her. At 5.40 p.m., the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which until then had been steering about S. by E. sighted enemy cruisers to the westward and turned to about W.N.W. It is apparent that the Rear-xA.dmiral Commanding, Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, was misled by the difterence in reckoning between the l)attlefleet and battle-cruiser fleet and had gone too far to the eastward, actually crossing ahead of the two engaged battle-cruiser squadrons until meeting the enemy advanced cruisers. At 5.52 p.m., the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron and " Canterbury " engaged three enemy light-cruisers which were then administering heavy punishment to " Chester," " Shark " (Commander L. W. Jones), " Acasta " (Lieutenant-Commander J. 0. Barron), " Opheha " (Commander L. G. E. Crabbe) and " Christopher " Lieutenant-Commander F. M. Kerr), and at 6 p.m., one of the enemy light-cruisers was observed by all three ships of tlie Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron to blow up. During the engagement, " Shark " was sunk, and " Acasta " severely damaged. At about 6.10 p.m., the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron sighted the battle-cruiser fleet, and at 6.21 p.m., took station ahead of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-Cruiser Fleet, in " Lion," the " Chester " then taking station astern of the Second Cruiser Squadron and remaining with that squadron for the night. On taking station ahead of " Lion," the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron engaged the enemy's leading battle-cruiser, which vessel returned the Are, and at 6.36 p.m. " Invincible "* (Captain Arthur L. Cay, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood) blew up. The cause was possibly the same as that suggested in the case of " Indefatigable." " Lion," proceeding at full speed, drew ahead, the Vice-Admiral, ordering the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron to take station astern of his line. Disposition and Movements of the British Battlefleet and Cruiser Squadrons. At 5.4 p.m., the attached cruisers were ordered to take up approach stations. The cruiser line at this time was sixteen miles aliead of the battlefleet, the ships being stationed from port to star)ward as follows : — Cochrane," '•' Shannon," "Minotaur," "Defence," " Duke of Edinburgh," " Black Prince " " Warrior," " Hampshire " (linking ship). cruisers in the screen being eight miles ajjart, centre of the screen bearing S.E. by S. At 5.40 p.m., heavy firing was heard ahead by " Minotaiu-, and soon afterwards ships were seen in the mist and were challenged by " Minotaur." " Cochrane " and " Shannon "' were recalled by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron, and formed into line, the signal being made to engage the enemy. The conditions were exceedingly difficult for making out ships, but the strange vessels on replying to the cliallenge were ascertained to be the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron (RearAdmiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood). At 5.52 p.m., Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in " Defence," signalled that the battlefleets would shortly be e.igaged. Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, in '' Minotaur," with the Second Cruiser Squadron, made a sweep to the eastward to ensure that no enemy minelayers were at work in that direction, and proceeded to take up deployment station two points on the engaged van of the battlefleet, being joined there by " Duke of Edinburgh " at 7.17 p.m. At 5.50 p.m., the cruisers on the right flank of the cruiser line had come in contact with the enemy cruisers. A large three-funnelled enemy light-cruiser was engaged and disabled by ' Defence " and " Warrior." She drifted down between the lines, being fired on by the battlefleet, and was subsequently seen to sink by several independent observers. " Defence " and " Warrior " of the First Cruiser Sciuadron, which vessels had turned to starboard during the engagement with the hght-cruisers, passed between our own and the enemy battle-cruisers and battlefleet, and the two ships found themselves within comparatively short range of the enemy's heavy ships. At 6.16 p.m., " Defence " was observed to be heavily hit and blew up ; " Warrior " was badly hit and disabled, but reached the rear of the battlefleet and was taken in tow by " Engadine." It is probable that Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot did not realise the proximity of the German battlefleet, and coming across it at short range in the mist was unable to extricate his squadron before his flagship was sunk and the " Warrior " disabled. Arrival of the Battlefleet. At 5.45 p.m., " Comus " (Captain Alan G. Hotham), of the Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron, then three miles ahead of the battlefleet, reported that heavy gunfiring was heard from a direction south. The flashes of guns were shortly afterwards observed S.S.W., and at 5.56 p.m., some vessels, subsequently seen to be the British battle-cruisers, were seen bearing S.S.W. from " Marlborough," steering E., heavily engaged with an unseen enemy. At 6.0 p.m., " Iron Duke's " position was latitude 57° 11' N., longitude 5° 39' E., course S.E. by S., speed twenty knots; battlefleet in divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard (Organisation No. 5), columns eleven cables apart. It Avas apparent on meeting that the reckoning of the battle- cruiser fleet was about twelve miles to the eastward of " Iron Duke's " reckoning. In consequence of this the enemy were sighted on the starboard bow instead of ahead, and some twenty minutes earlier than was anticipated. At 6 p.m., the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-Cruiser Fleet, reported enemy battle-cruisers bearing S.E., and at 6. 14 p.m., in reply to a signal, he rej)orted the enemy battlefleet in sight, bearing S.S.W. Owing to the uncertainty as to the position of the enemy battlefleet, it had not been possible to redispose the guides of columns on anj' different bearing. Consequently, the dej^loyment was carried out under some disadvantage, and, indeed, it Avas not easy to determine the correct direction of deployment until the battlefleets were almost in contact. At this stage it was not clear whether the enemy battlefleet was ahead of our Ijattlefleet or on the starboard beam, as heavy firing was proceeding from ahead to the starboard beam and the cruisers ahead were seen to be hotly engaged. In order to take ground to starboard a signal was made at 6.2 p.m., to alter course by 9 pendant to South, but it was then reahsed that the enemy battlefleet must be in close proximity, either ahead or on the starboard side, and the fleet was turned back by 9 pendant to S.E. preparatory to deployment to port. The Flotillas were directed to take up destroyer disposition No. 1 at 6.8 p.m. At 6.16 p.m., line of battle was formed by the main battlefleet by Equal Speed pendant on the port wing division ; course S.E. by E. Speed had been reduced at 6.02 p.m., to eighteen knots to admit of shi])s closing up, and it was further reduced to fourteen knots on deployment to allow the battle-cruisers, which were before the starboard beam, to pass ahead. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, having sighted " Marlborough " at 6.6 p.m., and other ships of the fifth and sixth divisions at 6.19 p.m., turned his squadron to port at 6.20 p.m., to form astern of the sixth division. During this turn the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron came under a heavy fire from the enemy's leading battleships, but the shooting was not good and few hits were made. At this time " Warspite's " helm unfortunately jammed, causing her to continue to turn towards the enemy's battlefleet. By good handling, although hit several times, " Warspite " was enabled to get away to the northward. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, subsequently ordered her to proceed to Rosyth on receipt of a report of her damage. By 6.30 p.m., the Fifth Battle Squadron (less " Warspite "), was formed astern of " Agincourt " in the battle Hne. At 6.33 p.m., speed was increased to seventeen knots, which speed was maintained until the Fleet left the scene for its bases on 1st June. Enclosure No. III. shows the order of the battlefleet, etc., at 6.40 p.m. Battlefleet Action. The First Battle Squadron, at the rear of the battle hne and the furthest to the westward during deployment, came into action almost immediately the deployment signal had been hauled down. At 6.15 p.m., a salvo pitched short of and over the forecastle of " Hercules," deluging the bridge and conning tower with water. The enemy at this time were made out by our rear ships to be in single hne, steering to the eastward, their battle-cruisers leading, followed by four " Konigs," four or five " Kaisers " and four " Helgolands," the remainder of the hne being invisible owing to the large overlap we had established, and to the converging course. " Marlborough " and her division opened fire at 6.17 p.m. on one of the " Kaiser " class. " Hercules " opened fire at 6.20 p.m. on the second " Kaiser." " Colossus " and her division opened fire at 6.30. The practice from the First Battle Squadron was very satisfactory under the conditions and severe punishment was administered to the enemy. " Marlborough " continued her fire with great success even after the ship had assumed a considerable hst after being torpedoed; " Agincourt's " powerful armament was used with good effect, and other ships were also observed to be scoring frequent hits. " Iron Duke " opened fire at 6.23 p.m. at a three-funnelled Hght-cruiser passing down the hne. This cruiser was engaged by other ships, was heavily hit, and was observed to sink by several eye-mtnesses at the end of the hne. At 6.25 p.m. " Falmouth " and " Yarmouth " of the Third Light-Cruiser Squadron, stationed on the starboard bow of " Lion " fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser. The Third Light-Cruiser Squadron then attacked the enemy ships with gunfire. The battle-cruisers were well ahead by 6.30 p.m. and had reduced to eighteen knots, gradually closing the enemy van and concentrating a heavy fire on the leading ship. At 6.30 " Iron Duke " shifted her fire to the leading battle- ship (one of the " Konig " class) bearing S.W., range 11,000 yards, and hit her several times in the third and fourth salvoes at 6.33 p.m. The remainder of the third divi.sion also opened fire on the leading enemy battleships of '' Konig " class. " Benbow " and the fourth division opened fire at 6.30 p.m., and " Orion " and certain ships of the Second Battle Squadron also opened fire at this time on the rear enemy l^attle-cruisers and leading battleships. At 6.40 p.m. the second " Konig " was seen to be heavil}^ hit and to be ablaze fore and aft, then to turn 16 points to starboard, the original third ship passing her. The ship then settled by the stern and was observed to blow up by independent witnesses in " Thunderer," " Benbow," " Barham," " Marne," " Morning Star," and " Magic," at 6.50 p.m. At this time the visibility was about 12,000 yards, and for ranges about 9,000 yards. The light was, however, extremely baffling, partly due to misty clouds appearing and dissolving, and partly due to layers of smoke from funnels and ships firing. The direction of the wind was W.S.W., force 2. At 6.55 p.m. the course of the Fleet was altered by divisions to south, conforming to the movements of the battle-cruiser squadrons and with a view to closing the enemy. Firing was general in the battlefleet, but the use of distribution of gunfire signals was out of the question, only three or four ships being in sight at a time from the van and centre, although more were visible from the rear. Ships fired at what they could see, while they could see it. Hitting had by this time become general. At 6.54, the Vice-Admiral Commanding, First Battle Squadton, in " Marlborough," reported that his flagship had been struck by a torpedo or mine. Later evidence pointed to it being a torpedo, possibly discharged from a submarine. This is supported by the report of " Revenge." Officers in the transmitting station, " A " and " Y " shell rooms, the director tower and spotting tower all felt a shock as if the ship had struck something. A few minutes after the " Marlborough " was torpedoed. A large patch of oil, with an upheaval in the middle and portions of wreckage, came to the surface. " Revenge," on seeing " Marlborough " struck, had hauled out of the line to port about a cable and probably struck and sank a submarine. At this time the destroyer " Acasta " was passed in a disabled condition. She signalled that she was holed fore and aft and unable to move her engines. In spite of her condition her ship's company were observed to be cheering as the battlefleet passed. At 6.55 p.m. " Iron Duke " passed the wreckage of " Invincible." The sliip was spUt in two, the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre part resting apparently on tlic bottom. The position of the wreck was latitude 57° 6' N., longitude 5°02' E. " Badger " was picking up survivors. In order to guard against the risk of secret documents being recovered by the enemy sliould the position of the wreck be located by remaining above water, a submarine was sent from BIyth to search for and if necessary, sink the wreck. She was unable to find it, and there is no doubt that the vessel sank. At 7.10 p.m. " Marlborough " and several other ships were firing at the second of the three of the remaining " Konig " class ("Marlborough" fired fourteen salvoes). At 7.18 a ship turned out of the line very low in the water aft and sinking. An Officer in the torpedo control tower in ' Colossus " saw this ship sink at 7.30 p.m., his evidence being confirmed by " Benbow," " Superb," " Colossus," and " Malaya." At 7.12 p.m. enemy battle-cruisers also emerged from the mist at 10,000 yards range on the starboard beam of the " Colossus " division, which opened fire on them. A ship of the " Derffiinger " class was observed to be hit several times by " Colossus " and " Neptune," and listed over and passed out of sight obscured by heavy smoke and mist. " Colossus " was hit, but only suffered triffing damage. At the same time a ship of the " Seydfitz " class was also fired at and hit by " ColHngwood." " Revenge " also fired at and hit a battle- cruiser supposed to be " Von Der Tann," which then turned away. Attacks by Enemy Flotilla on Battlefleet. At about 7.10 p.m. a flotilla of enemy destroyers supported by a cruiser was seen approaching " Iron Duke," bearing from " Iron Duke " S. 50° W. (60° green). The Fleet was turned away two points by the " Preparative " and subsequently another two points, fire being opened on the flotilla with 4-in,, 6-in., and turret guns at a range of about 10,000 to 8,000 yards. When at about 8,000 yards range, the 'destroyers fired their torpedoes, turning towards the rear of their line and dis- appearing in a smoke screen. No torpedoes hit. One destroyer was observed to sink. At about 7.25 p.m. another enemy's destroyer attack was observed approaching the rear of the battle line from a bearing about 120° green, 9,000 yards from " Iron Duke," and was heavily engaged by the four rear divisions of the battlefleet and Fifth Battle squadron. The Eleventh Flotilla and Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron had advanced to counter the former enemy destroyer attack and were in a favourable position to counter the second attack during which at 7.22 p.m. they sank an enemy destroyer. They were recalled at 7.40 p.m. In addition, the third destroyer from the left was observed to sink, and the left-hand one to be struck and turned bottom upapproximately at 7.35 p.m. At 7.45 p.m. a division of the Twelfth Flotilla, consisting of " Obedient," " Mindful," " Marvel," and " Onslaught," proceeded to attack, and sink an enemy *' V "-class destroyer flying a Commodore's pendant near the rear of the Fifth Battle Squadron. Line had again been formed at 7.33 p.m. on a S. by W. course and at 7.41 p.m. course was altered to the S.W. PAt 7.30 p.m. the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron, having previously turned towards the German line to keep in touch with the enemy's rear, observed the enemy alter course to S. by W. At 8.30 " Southampton " and " Dublin " attacked an enemy destroyer and hit her heavily amidships. She was shortly afterwards seen to sink. At 8 p.m. firing had practically ceased except towards the rear of the line, where some of the ships of the First and Fifth Battle Squadrons were still engaged. Whilst the battlefleet had been turned away from enemy torpedo attacks, the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-Cruiser Fleet, had continued engaging the head of the enemy line, gradually hauling round to S.W. by S. and then S.W. to keep in touch. At 7.32 p.m. " Lion's " course was S.W., speed eighteen knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. The battle-cruiser fleet were inflicting considerable punishment on the enemy, so much so that the enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were called upon to cover the capital ships by emitting volumes of grey smoke. Under cover of this smoke, the enemy were lost sight of at 7.45 p.m. At 7.58 p.m. the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-Cruiser Fleet ordered the First and Third Light-Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line. The British battlefleet also turned to the westward. At 8.30 p.m. the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-Cruiser Fleet, again sighted the enemy and engaged the leading enemy battle-cruiser at a range of 10,000 yards—only two were sighted. This battle-cruiser was struck by two salvoes and burst into flames and smoke. Heavy explosions took place on board and the ship turned away with a heavy list. " Princess Royal " set fire to a three-funnelled battleship. " New Zealand " and " Indomitable " report that the third ship of the Une which they engaged heeled over and was on fire. The enemy was last seen by " Falmouth " steaming to the westward. At 8.40 p.m. all battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck by a mine, torpedo, or sunken wreckage. It seems probable that, in view of the condition in which the enemy were last seen the shock indicated the blowing up of one of their heavy vessels. Night Disposition. Darkness was now rapidly setting in, the mist was increasing and it became necessary to decide on the future course of action. The British Fleet was between the enemy and his base. Each side possessed a considerable number of destroyers, it being most probable that the enemy was largely superior in this respect, in numbers, as it was logical to assume that every available torpedo-boat destroyer and torpedo-boat had been ordered out as soon as contact between the fleets became probable. I rejected at once the idea of a night action between the heavy ships, as leading to possible disaster owing, first, to the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers, and, secondly, to the impossibility of distinguishing between our own and enemy vessels. Further, the result of a night action under modern conditions must always be very largely a matter of jDure chance. I was loth to forego the advantage of position, which would have resulted from an easterly or westerly course, and I therefore decided to steer to the southw^ard, where I should be in a position to renew the engagement at dayhght, and should also be favourably placed to intercept the enemy should he make for his base by steering for HeHgoland or toward^ the Ems and thence along the north German coast. Further, such a course enabled me to drop my destroyer flotillas astern, thus at one and the same time providing the battlefleet with a screen against attack by torpedo craft at night, and also giving our flotillas an opportunity for attacking the enemy's heavy ships should they also be proceeding to the southward vnih the object of regaining their bases. Accordingly, at 9 p.m., the fleet was turned by divisions to south (speed seventeen knots) the second organisation being assumed, and the fleet formed in divisions hne ahead disposed abeam to port, columns one mile apart, the object of the close formation being that the divisions should remain clearly in sight of each other during the night, in order to prevent ships mistaking each other for enemy vessels. At 9.24 p.m., the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-Cruiser Fleet, in latitude 56° 29' N., longitude 5° 27' E., turned to south. At 9.27 p.m., the destroyer flotillas were ordered to take station five miles astern of the battlefleet. At 9.32 p.m., " Abdiel " was directed to lay mines in wide zig-zags from a position fifteen miles 215° from the Vyl hghtvessel in a mean direction 180°, ten mines to the mile. This operation was successfully accomplished without observation, and " Abdiel " then proceeded to Rosyth to replenish with mines. At 10 p.m., " Iron Duke's " position was : — latitude, 56° 22' N., longitude, 5° 47' E., course, south, speed, 17 knots, the order of the fleet from west to east being as follows : — Battle-Cruiser Fleet; Cruiser Squadrons Battlefleet (in divisions, disposed abeam to port, columns one mile apart, in Organisation No. 2) ; First Light-Cruiser Squadron four miles one point before the starboard beam of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet; Second Light-Cruiser Squadron astern of the Fifth Battle Squadron and Second Battle Squadron Third Liglit-Cruisor Squadron on starboard bow of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet: Fourtli Light-Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battlefleet; Destroyer Flotillas—five miles astern of the Battlefleet in the order, west to east—Eleventh, Fourth, Twelfth, Ninth,! Tenth,! Thirteenth. At 10.20 p.m., the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron engaged five enemy ships, apparentl}^ a cruiser and four light-cruisers, which concentrated on " Southampton " and " DubHn " and severely damaged both of them. The enemy, however, were beaten off. No enemy ship was seen by the battlefleet during the night, except by " Active " astern of the Second Battle Squadron. Firing was heard astern, searchlights were seen in use, and a fair number of star shells were fired by the enemy, which gave out a brilliant illumination, and it was evident that our destroyer flotillas and light-cruiser squadrons were in action. From reports received subsequently it is fairly certain that the German battlefleet and battle-cruisers crossed astern of the British battlefleet and made for the Horn Reef channel. In crossing the rear of the British battle line, the enemy fleet came in contact with the British flotillas, which seized the opportunity to deliver a series of brilliant and gallant attacks. The estimated course of the enemy fleet was S.E. | E., and the estimated time of the last battle squadron passing the Horn Reef light-vessel abeam, eighteen miles distant, was 3.45 a.m. Submarine E55, on the bottom to the west of the Horn Reef light-vessel, heard eleven explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 a.m. on the 1st June. The estimated time of the last of the enemy's heavy ships passing over " Abdiel's " minefield is 5 a.m.
 * ' overs " fired at " Malaya " by the enemy's battlefleet.