Reports from First Battle Squadron

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Enclosure No. 2 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets. No. 021. Royal Oak, 10th June, 1916. Sir, I have the honour to report that the First Battle Squadron and Bellona left the Northern Base in accordance with your orders at 9.30 p.m. 30th May, 1916, my Flag being in Marlborough, and proceeded in company with your Flag to the Southeastward.

2. The first intimation of the enemy being at sea was received in Marlborough about 2.30 p.m. 31st May, a signal being intercepted from Galatea to Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, reporting enemy cruisers bearing E.S.E. Further enemy reports were received from various units of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and at 3.55 a signal was made by Senior Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, that he was engaging the enemy. At 4.0 p.m., Senior Officer. 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported enemy battle-fleet in sight steering East, and at 5.0 p.m. that they had altered course to North. The situation as it developed was reported by visual signal from time to time to the ships under my command. About 5.30 p.m. heavy gun firing was heard on the starboard bow and a little later flashes were clearly seen. At 5.45 p.m., " Lion," " Princess Royal," " Tiger " and " New Zealand " were sighted on starboard bow heavily engaged with the enemy, whose flashes could now be seen to the South- ward, this being reported to Flag at 6.0 p.m., at which time our battle-cruisers were bearing S.S.W. 3 to 4 miles, steering East, '* Lion," the leading ship. The 5th Battle Squadron then came in sight bearing S.W., also heavily engaged. 3. At 6.2 p.m., " Marlborough's " position was Lat. 57.04 N., Long. 5.29 E., course being altered by 9 pendant to South, speed

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18 knots, and at 6.6 p.m. course was again altered to S.E. by 9 pendant. 6.15 p.m., Signal Avas received to form line of battle S.E. by E. by equal speed pendant, enemy bearing E.S.E. from " Barham." 4. About this time the Battle-cruisers, who appeared to be ahead of the leading division, turned to starboard as if to cross the enemy's T. 5. One of our armoured cruisers, probably " Warrior," was observed passing down the engaged side, making for her position in rear of the hne. When near the end of the hne she turned up parallel to it and engaged the enemy at short range. Heavy enemy salvoes were observed to fall all round her; she then turned about 14 points to port, a salvo struck her and a large flame was seen to burst from her quarter deck and she then passed astern. 6. A salvo of 5 shots fell ahead of the " Hercules " about 6.15 p.m. As the Battle-cruisers drew ahead and their smoke cleared, the German hne could be more easily seen and 4 Kaisers and 4 Helgolands could be dimly made out. " Marlborough " opened fire at 6.17 p.m. at a battleship of the Kaiser class range 13,000 yards, about Green 110. " Marlborough " fired 7 salvoes and hits were observed in 5th and 7th salvoes, the remainder of the squadron opening fire as a target became visible. 7. At 6.20 p.m., speed of 14 knots was ordered by general signal. Shortly after this there was much bunching up of ships in the rear of the hne, " Marlborough " and other ships had to reduce to 8 laiots and " St. Vincent " had to stop for a short time. Owing to haze and the enemy's smoke, organised distri- bution of fire was out of the question ; individual ships selected their own targets. 8. As the action developed and disabled ships of both sides passed down between the fines, great difficulty was experienced in distinguishing the enemy's from our own ships. 9. " Marlborough " now shifted fire to a three funnelled ship, and at 6.34 p.m. formed up astern of the fine and opened fire on a battle ship of the Kaiser class. 10. At 6.45 p.m. " Marlborough " altered course to avoid a torpedo. At 6.54 p.m. a heavy explosion was experienced under the Fore bridge, the ship taking up a list of 8 degrees to starboard. The torpedo had struck the ship abreast of No. 1 dynamo room and hydraufic room, both of which were flooded, the 2 men stationed in the former being killed. Water was also reported up to the floor plates in " A " boiler room and it was considered necessary to draw the fires in that boiler room, but as a speed of 17 knots could be maintained I decided that " Marlborough " should maintain her position in the hne and continue to lead her division. The list remained steady and it

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was reported in less than an hour that the water wa« being kept under. 11. Shortly after being struck, "Marlborough" opened fire on an enemy cruiser passing down the Une which was suspected of having fired the torpedo. The 3rd and 4th salvoes both hit and appeared to open up her side, as a deep red flame could be seen inside her hull. A torpedo was fired at her at 7.10 p.m. During this time the " Acasta " was passed disabled on the port side, and " Marlborough " avoided 3 more torpedoes by the use of the helm. 12. " Marlborough " then engaged a ship of the Konig class, firing 14 salvoes. Distinct hits were seen in four salvoes. (The gunnery difficulties experienced by the ship after she was torpedoed are reported in the ship's gunnery report.) This ship finally turned out of the line, very low in the water aft, and was apparently sinking. A destroyer was observed to place herself on her engaged side, and make a dense smoke in order to screen her. 13. Shortly after this a heavy smoke screen was"observed at what appeared to be the head of the enemy battlefleet, and it was soon apparent that the destroyers were attacking under its cover. I immediately hoisted the signal " KM," informing our flotillas astern that the enemy flotillas were making an attack. At the same time the preparative was hoisted, and I turned my division away. As far as I could judge the whole squadron opened fire on the attacking destroyers with the whole of the secondary and some of the main armament, and the attack was checked, and they turned away, but not before they were able to fire some of their torpedoes, which, however, were avoided. Two of the enemy's destroyers were observed to be hit by " Marlborough's " 6-inch gun fire alone, and there must have been others as the fire was so intense. 14. As the destroyer attack developed the enemy battlefleet in sight were observed to turn at least 8 points until their sterns were towards our line. They ceased fire, dechned further action, and disappeared into Ihe mist. Our destroj'^ers in rear of the line proceeded out to attack the enemy destroyers and sink any disabled craft. 15. During the action at one period the enemy appeared to be firing steady, well drilled salvoes, by some form of director such as the Petravic system, but their rangefinding and range keeping appear to have been at fault when they were hit, although the firing on our armoured cruisers was remarkable for its accuracy. Many of their salvoes were seen to fall over and it was not till late in the action that they apparently' found the range when

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the " Colossus " was straddled by 4 successive salvoes, correct for elevation. 16. As the action progressed their fire became more feeble. A certain number of shell of 4-in. or 6-in. calibre were seen to burst on the water just short of " Marlborough " and other ships of the First Battle Squadron, some leaving a cloud of Hght green vapour, and others a heavy grey vapour which spread over the surface of the water. 17. During the action many reports of submarines were made, some being undoubtedly authentic, and course was altered to attack them and avoid their torpedoes. Shortly before " Marlborough " was torpedoed, a heavy shock was felt on board " Revenge " in the transmitting room and other places, and two independent officer witnesses saw quantities of oil float to the surface and wreckage come up astern. 18. The tracks of torpedoes approaching the ship were clearly seen from the top and reported in good time so that they were avoided, with the exception of the one which struck the ship, and therefore it is considered to be probable that it came from a submarine. 19. It is estimated that at least 21 torpedoes passed through the First Battle Squadron, only one taking effect. 20. Before, during, and after the action the wireless tele- graphy communication throughout the squadron were entirely satisfactory and invaluable for manoeuvring and action signals, especially in the case of the repeating ship (" Bellona "), who was often unable to distinguish the flag signals. No damage to aerials or instruments was sustained except in " Marlborough," whose auxihary aerial was partially shot away, and an inter- mittent earth on the main aerial feeder, which could not be traced for three quarters of an hour, interrupted the reception of distant signals. In " Colossus " the internal buzzer communication between Main office and signal tower was shot av/aJ^ No enemy signalling was heard on auxiliary, and though the}' continually attempted to jamb the main installation signals from ships in company were easily overread. 21. After the enemy disappeared in the haze the First Battle Squadron conformed to the movements of your flag, but though " Marlborough " went the revolutions for 17 knots I estimate the speed over the ground was only approximately 15-8 owing to the damage. Consequently the 6th division fell some way astern during the night. 22. Four night attacks were observed during the night, the first on the starboard beam, the others taldng place in successiontowardsthestem. Severalexplosionswereheardand 2 very large ones with flames shooting up into the sky were seen ; star shell were seen.

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23. About midnight, smoke was observed ahead of " Marl- borough," which crossed from starboard to port and back again from port to starboard, and then came down the starboard side. It ai)peared to be a large ship and was challengd by " Revenge," who was answered by 2 letters, though they were not the correct ones. She then disappeared. 24. At 2.30 a.m., 1st June, it was reported to me that the bulkhead in " A " boiler room of " Marlborough " would not stand the speed, namely, revolutions for 17 knots, and that it was advisable to reduce to 10 or 12 knots. In consequence of this " Marlborough " was hauled out of Une and the remainder of the division continued. I signalled " Fearless," who was observed to be astern of " Agincourt," to come alongside " Marlborough," and I and my Staff transferred to " Revenge " in her, and then sent her back to escort " Marlborough," who was subsequently ordered to Rosyth via "M" Channel. 25. Shortly after arriving in " Revenge " a Zeppelin was sighted, evidently scouting. Fire was opened on her which caused her to dip and she quicldy disappeared. She looked a remarkably easy target if shrapnel had been available. 26. At dayhght, owing to the very low visibility and to the fact that the Division had dropj^ed so far astern during the night (as explained above) and also to the transfer of my Flag to " Revenge," the remainder of the Fleet was out of sight. I shaped course as necessary to affect a junction. At 3.40 a.m., " Faulknor " with " Obedient " and " Marvel " joined my Flag and reported the 12th Flotilla had attacked a Division of the German Battlefleet during the night, and that one battleship had been blown up. 27. At 5.15 a.m., "Revenge" passed through the wreckage of a German battleship or battle-cruiser, judging from the size of the floating powder cases. At 6.30 a.m., what appeared to be the wreckage of the " Black Prince " was passed through, and a httle later 2 rafts wereobservedwiththreemenonthem. Iordered"Obedient" to take them off, but she reported on rejoining that before she got there they had been taken off by a Dutch steamer, whose Captain protested against their being taken off his steamer, and so the Captain of " Obedient " left them. • At 8.35 a.m., passed " Sparrowhawk " abandoned with " Marksman " close to. " Marksman " reported she was unable to tow her. She had attempted to do so, but the hawsers had parted. I, therefore, ordered her to sink her. She did so and then joined my Flag. Nothing else of interest occurred and I rejoined your Flag that evening.

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29. The following ammunition was fired by the First Battle Squadron :-

30. I would like to bring to your notices the conduct of the crew of the Acasta, as mentioned in the report from the Captain of Hercules ; although badly damaged and apparently in a hopeless state, they cheered the Hercules as the latter passed. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, CECIL BURNEY, Vice-Admiral Commanding First Battle Squadron. The Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet

GUNNERY REPORT, H.M.S. MARLBOROUGH
H.M.S.Marlborough

4th June 1916

Gunner Report
Number of rounds fired.