Admiral Scheer's Despatch

Page 587
Berlin 1916

German Plan VII. —The Return of the Main Fleet, 31 May-1 June.
NOTE.—All times in this report are German (summer time) time, i.e., two hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time. The Germans appear to use the words " armoured cruiser " and " battle cruiser" indiscriminately; the literal translation has been INTERIM REPORT BY THE COMMAND OF THE HIGH SEA FORCES ON THE BATTLE OF THE SKAGERRAK.

Commander-in-Chief

of the

High Sea Forces.

July 4, 1916.

Your Royal and Imperial Majesty's humble servant has the honour to report on the operation of 31 May and 1 June, and the Battle of the Skagerrak, as follows :

A. THE OBJECT UNDERLYING THE OPERATION.
The operation against Lowestoft on 23 and 24 April of this year had the effect which our war plan intended it to have. The enemy justly considered it as a challenge, and was clearly not disposed to submit a second time to a similar blow without opposition. He began to rouse himself. We heard of fresh groupings of his naval forces at the various bases on the East Coast, and of repeated cruises by considerable portions of his Fleet in the northern part of the North Sea. This situation suited our plans, and I decided to utilize it to the full by making a renewed advance with our whole Fleet as soon as the refit of the SEYDLITZ was complete. The temporary suspension of the Submarine warfare against Commerce permitted of the co-operation of all submarines which were ready for sea.

Page 588
In the middle of May, therefore, I despatched all submarines to sweep through the northern portion of the North Sea, and to take up positions off the enemy's main bases: i.e., Humber, Firth of Forth, Moray Firth and Scapa Flow, from 23 May onwards, and then to compel the enemy to put to sea, by making an advance with our Fleet, and to ^ive battle under conditions favourable to vis. I hoped by these dispositions to bing the submarines into action and at the same time to utilize them for reconnaissance purposes. Two operations wore prepared, one, an advance in a North-Westerly direction against the English Coast, the other, an advance in a Northerly direction into the Skaggerak. For the North-Westerly advance, extended scouting by airships was indispensable, as it would lead into an area where wo could not let ourselves be drawn into an action against our will. There was less danger of this in the Northeily advance, for th(> coast of Jutland afforded a certain cover against surprise from the East, and the distances from the enemy's bases were greater. Aerial reconnaissance, although desirable here also, was not absolutely necessary. The advance towards the North West promised to be the more effective, and was therefore consideied first ; consequently all airships were kept in readiness for the operation from 23 May onwards. Unfortunately the weather was unfavouiable for the undertaking. The Fleet waited in vain from 23-30 May for weather favom-able for aerial scouting. The weather on 30 May showing no signs of change, and it being impossible to keep the submarines off the enemy ports any longer, I decided to abandon the North-Westerly advance, and to carry out that towards the North, if necessarj% without the assistance of airships.

B. THE PLAN OF OPERATION.
The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, was ordered to leave the Jade at 4 a.in. on 31 May, with the I and II Scouting Groups, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers in the REGENSBURG and the II, VI and IX Destroyer Flotillas, and to push on to the Skagerrak, keeping out of sight of Horns Reef and the Danish Coast, to show himself before dark off the Norwegian coast, so that the British would receive news of the operation, and to carry out a cruiser and cominerce warfare during the late afternoon and the following night oft' and in the Skagerrak. The Main Fleet, consisting of the I, II and III Squadrons, IV Scouting Group, 1st Leader of Destroyers in the ROSTOCK and the remainder of the Destroyer Flotillas, was to follow at 4.30 a.m., to cover the Scouting Forces during the operation, and to meet them on the morning of 1 Jume. The detached submarines were informed by wireless that the enemy forces might put to sea on 31 May and 1 June. German Plan I shows the intended operation. German Plan TI shows the areas to be swept by the submarines and their distribution off the enemy's harbours. The Naval Corps (Flanders) gladly undertook to block the British Naval Ports in the Hoofden in a similar manner.

1. Upto the encounter with the enemy.
The Channel swept by our Mineseeking Forces to the West of Amrum Bank, through the enemy minefields. enabled the High Sea Forces to reach the open sea in safety. Scouting by airship was at first not possible on account of the weather. At 7.37 a.m. " U. 32 " reported 2 heavy ships 2 cruisers and several destroyers about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, on a South-Easterly course.

Page 589
At 8.30 p.m. (sic) the wireless "decoding" station Neuniiinster reported that 2 large war vessels or squadrons with destroyers had left Scapa Flow. At 8.48 a.m. " U. 66" reportetl having sighted, aljout 60 miles East of Kinnaird Head, 8 enemy heavy ships, hght cruisers and destroyers on a Nortli-Kasterly course. The reports gave no indication of the enemy's intentions. The difference in the composition of the individual units and their divergent (sic—Trans.) courses did not sliow that they intended to co-operate or to advance against the German Bight, or that their movements had any connection whatsoever with our opei-ation. The reports received did not, therefore, cause us to modify oui- plans, but only led us to hope that we might succeed in bringing a part of the enemy's Fleet to action. Between 2 and 3 ji.m., L. 9, L. 16, L. 21, L. 23 and L. 14 ascended in succession for the purpose of long-distance reconnaissance in the sector between North and \\'est from Heligoland. They did iiot succeed in taking part in the action which developed soon afterwards, nor did they observe anything of our Main Fleet or of the enemy, nor did they hear anything of the engagement, although L. 14, according to her own reckoning, was over the scene of action at 10 p.m. The ELBINC4, the cruiser on the western wing of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces' screen, despatched the leaderboat of the IV Destroyer Half-flotilla to examine a steamer. At 4.28 p.m. this destroyer reported having sighted some single enemy ships about 90 miles west of Bovberg.

Figure 1.
Screen of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces.

Image Not Uploaded

On sighting our forces, the enemy (8 light cruisers of the CAROLINE class) altered course at once to the North. Our cruisers gave chase, with the result that at 5.20 p.m. the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces sighted two columns of large ships steering about East bearing about West; they were soon recognised to be 6 battle cruisers— LIONS, 1 TIGER, 2 INDEFATIGABLES—and light forces. The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces recalled the II Scouting Group, which was to the North of him in chase of the enemy, and ])roceeded to attack. The enemy deployed towards the South and formed line of battle. The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces followed this movement (which was exceedingly welcome, as it afforded us the possibility of drawing the enemy on to fjur Main Fleet) ; he advanced in quarter line to within effe(!tive range, opening flic at 5.49 p.m. at a range of about 13,000 metres (14,217 yards).

2. The first phase of the Battle: the Cruiser Action.
The action took place on a South-Easterly course, its exact progress is shown in German Plan IV. The Senior OfTicer of Scouting Forces kept the enemy at an effective distance. His guns weie well laid. Hits were registered on all the enemy ships. B\- 6. i:{ p.m. the armoured cruiser INDEFATIGABLE, the last ship in the line, was sunk with a violent explosion b\- the fire of the VON DER TANN. The giumer>' supetioiity, and atlvantageous tactical position were distinctly on our side, luitil, at 6.19 p.m. a new .squadron, consisting of 4 or 5 ships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, with a considerable superiority in speed, appeared from a North-Westerly direction, and took part in the action with an opening range of about 20,000 metres (21,872 yards). This rendered the po.sition of our cruisers critical. The new opponent fired with remarkable ia|)idity and accurac\', the accuracy being partly due to the impossibility of retui-ning his fire. At 6.26 p.m. the distance between the opjiosing ai'inoured cruisers was about 12,000 metres (13,123 yards), and between oiu- armoured cruisers and the QUEEN ELIZABETHS about 18,000 metres (19,685 yards). Of the Flotillas vmder the orders of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, only the IX Flotilla was at this time in a position from which an attack could be launched. The 2ad Leader of Destroyers (Commodore Heinrich) in REGENS- BURG, with some boats of the II Flotilla, proceeding at utmost speed, was about abreast of the van of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces. The cruisers of the II Scouting Grovip, with the remainder of the Flotillas, were compelled by the QUEEN ELIZABETHS to haul off to the P]ast, and, therefore, in spite of taxing their engines to the utmost, had not been able to reach their position in the van of the armovu-ed cruisers. In view of the situation, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers ordered the IX Flotilla to proceed to relieve the pressiu'e on the battle cruisers. This Flotilla was already proceeding to attack on its own initiative, in pursuance of orders given bj' its Senior Officer, Commander Goehle.

Figure 2.
Phase of the battle at 6.26 p.m

Image not uploaded

Page 591
At about 6.30 p.m. the IX Flotilla advanced to the attack uiuler heavy enemy fire. Twelve torjiedoes were fired at the enenu line at a range of 9,500-8,000 metres (10,389-8,749 yards). It was not possible to bring off the attack nearer to the enenn-, ji.s, simultaneovisly with the advance of the IX Flotilla, 15 to 2U Briti.sh destroyers, supported bj' light crui.sers, advanced to counter-attack and to repel our destroyers. A destroyer action resulted at very clo.se range (1,000-1,500 metres) (1.093-1,640' yards). The REOEXSBURC, with tho.se boats of the II Flotilla which were with her, and the mediiun calibre guns of the armouied cruisers, took part in the conflict. The enem>- tinned away after about 10 minutes. On oiu- side V. 27 and V. 29 were sunk by heavy shell fire. The crews of both boats were rescued luider enemy fire by V. 26 and 8. 35. On the enemy's side, 2, possibly 3, destroyers were sunk and 2 others so badly damaged that they were left behind and subsequently fell victim to the Main Fleet. The enemy made no attempt to save the crews of their boats. Diu-ing the destroj-er attack, the British armoured cruisers were effectively held bj* the large calibre guns of the I Scouting Group. ' The latter successfully evaded a large number of enemy torpedoes (observed by the IX Flotilla) bj' edging awa\- a few points. Towards 6.30 p.m. a violent explosion was observed on the third enemy armouied cruiser QUEEX ]\IARY. When the clouds of smoke dispersecl the enemy cruiser had disappeared. Whether her destruction was caused by the gtms, or by a torpedo from the armoured cruisers,' or bj' a torpedo from the IX Flotilla is uncertain. It was probably the work of the gmis. In any case the attack by the IX Flotilla resulted in the temporary cessation of the enemy's fire. The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces made use of this and ordered the armoured cruisers to turn in succession to a North-Westerly course, thereby ensiuing that he would be at the head of the cruisers in the next phase of the action. Immediately after the torpedo attack, the German Main Fleet appeared on the scene just in time to bring help to the Scouting Forces, which were engaged with the enemj' in considerably superior strength.

3. The second phase of the Battle: the Chase.
The Main Fleet was in the order K. 312*, the Fleet Flagship leading the I Squadron, course Xorth, speed 14 knots, distance apart of ships 700 metres (3^ cables), distance apart of Scjuadrons 3,500 metres (19 cables), the destroyers screening the Squach-ons against submarines, the light cruisers surroimding and screening the ^lain Fleet. At 4.28 p.m., when about 50 miles west of Lyngvig, the first information was received of the sighting of enemy light forces, and at 5.35 p.m. the first report came to hand that enemy heavy forces were in sight. The distance between the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces and the Main Fleet was at this time about 50 miles. On receipt of this report, line of Battle K. 312* was closed up, and the order " Clear for Action '" given. The report received at 5.45 p.m. from the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, that he was engaged with 6 enemy armoured cruisers on a South- Easterly com-se, showed that we had succeeded in bringing some of the enemy to action and in drawing them on to oiu Main FIf»et. The task of the Main Fleet was now to relieve the materiall.\- weaker armoured cruisers as quickly as po.ssible, and to endeavour to cut off a premature retreat of the enemy.

Page 592
For the latter reason I altered coiu-se to North-West at 6.05 p.m., increa-sed to 15 knots, and, a quarter of an horn- later, altered coui-.se to West in oi-der to bring the enemy between two fires. Whilst this alteration of course of the Main Fleet was in progress, the II Scouting Group reported that a British Squadron of 5 battleships was joining in the action. The position of the I Scouting (Jroup, which was now opposed by 6 armoured cruisers and 5 battleships, might become critical. In consequence everything depended on effecting a junction with the T Scouting (Jroup as soon as po.ssible : 1 therefore altered course back to North. At 6.32 p.m. sighted the ships in action. At 6.45 p.m. the III and I Squadrons were able to open fire, and the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces placed himself and his ships at the head of the Main Fleet.

German Plan VI. Phase of the Battle at 6.55 p.m.
The enemy's light forces turned immediately towards the West, and as soon as they were out of range, towards the North. It is doubtful whether they suffered any damage from the fire of our battlesliips in this short time. The British armoured cruisers turned in succession to North-West. The QUEEN ELIZABETHS followed in their wake, and thus covered the cruisers, which had suffered severely. At 6.49 p.m., while the Squadrons were passing each other, the Senior Ofificer of the VI Flotilla, Commander Max Schultz, attacked with the XI Half-Flotilla. The result could not be observed. The next phase of the battle became a chase : our Scouting Forces endeavom'ing to keep on the heels of the enemy battle cruisers, and our main body on those of the QUEEN ELIZABETHS. With this pm'pose in view ovu- main body proceeded at utmost speed, and, divisions separately, turned towards the enemy as far as North-West. In spite of this, the enemy's armoiu-ed cruisers succeeded in getting out of range of the I Scouting Group soon after 7 o'clock. The QUEEN ELIZABETHS were also able to increase their lead to such an extent that they could only be kept under fire by the 1 Scouting Group and the V Division. The hope that one of the pursued ships would be so badly disabled as to fall to the Main Fleet was not realised, although the shots fell well; at 7.30 p.m. it was clearly observed that a ship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class turned away, after having been hit .several times, and withdrew from the battle with diminished speed and with a heavy list to port. The ship was not observed to sink. In the meantime the ships of the Main Fleet were only able to sink 2 modern destroyers (Nestor and Nomad), which had been disabled during the attack of the IX Flotilla and subsequently overtaken. Their crews were made prisoners.

German Plan VI. Phase of the Battle at 7.15 p.m.
As at 7.20 p.m. the fire of the I Scouting Group and of the ships of the V Division seemed to slacken, I was under the impression that the enemy was succeeding in escaping, and therefore issued an order to the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, and therewith the permission to all vessels, for the " general chase." In the meantime the visibility, which had hitherto been good, became less so. The wind had backed from North-West through West to South- West. Smoke from cordite and funnels hung over the water and obscured all view from North to East. Our own Scouting Forces were only visible for a few seconds at a time